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Levy: Commercial Transactions

Commercial Transactions
by Neil M. Levy*
The emphasis of this article reflects the degree to which
commercial law today is statutory. Particularly in California,
where the Uniform Commercial Code has only been in effect
since January 1, 1965, few cases construing that statute
reached the appellate courts during the year 1967. However, the state legislature in 1967 amended 25 sections of
the California Commercial Code. 1 Although these amendments cover a wide range of substantive problems, they can
be viewed in the light of the policy of the code as enunciated
in section 1102(2) (c), "[t]o make uniform the law among
the various jurisdictions." In addition, one group of these
* A.B. 1963, Cornell University; J.D.
1966, University of Chicago Law
School. Assistant Professor, Golden
Gate College, School of Law. Member, New York State Bar.
1. Amended were §§ 1201(17), 1202,
1209, 1210, 2209(3)(4), 2403(4), 2719,
2725, 3107, 3112(1)(b) and (c), 3506,

5116(2), 6103, 7403(3), 7503, 7507,
7508, 8105, 8106, 8304, 8313(3), 8320
(5), 9104, 9301 and 9302. Senate Bill
580 also amended Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3440, dealing with fraudulent transfers, to reconcile it with Division 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
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amendments can best be analyzed by the effect upon freedom
of contract.
Uniformity and the Commercial Code
Both the official texe and the California version of the
Uniform Commercial Code state in section 1102(2):
Underlying purposes and policies of this code are
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) To make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.
As a text proposed for adoption in the various jurisdictions,
these policies have general agreement. It is obvious that
the more simple, clear, and modern the code, the greater the
likelihood of adoption of a uniform commercial law in all of
the states. When the proposed code is submitted to a particular state legislature, however, the various policies listed under
subsection 1102(2) may be in conflict; the legislature may
feel that the language of the official text can be further clarified or that modern commercial practices call for different
substantive rules of law. The state must then elect whether
to give priority to the policy of conformity with the official
text in order to achieve the desired uniformity. 3
William A. Schnader, chairman of the Permanent Editorial
Board4 for the Uniform Commercial Code, predictably is
currently the leading spokesman for uniformity.s He denies
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2. The official text of the Uniform
Commercial Code is the text promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute.

4. For a brief description of the
workings of the Permanent Editorial
Board, see Schnader, The Permallent
Editorial Board: Can It Accomplish Its
Object?, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. 137 (1965).

3. For a discussion of the similar
tensions in case development of the
code, see VoId, Construing the Uniform
Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys,
Uniformity and Growth, 50 CORN L. Q.
49 (1964).
48
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5. See Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should Be "Uniform", 20
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (1963).
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the need for state variations from the official text, even if
those variations are intended merely to clarify language. As
to minor variations, he states that the "amendments which
were trivial may be said to have done no harm but it can
be said with equal force that being trivial, they should not
have been made."6 But this objection seems unconvincing;
certainly the advantage to having uniform language in all
the states is to build up a body of national authority for handling difficult questions. But might not clarification of language be a superior method of removing these difficulties?
When considering major substantive variations, Schnader
stresses, as additional support for his position, that large banks
and sellers whose operations are national should not be forced
to investigate the laws of 50 states in order to operate. Thus
it seems clear, at least to Schnader, that uniformity is necessary in order to ease the legal and operative burdens of large
national concerns. Even conceding the importance of those
concerns to our present economy, one may answer that fulfilling their supposed needs is not the only legitimate function
of a commercial code.
Moreover, even if the official text of the Uniform Commercial Code were to be adopted in all states, some local problems
would remain for national concerns, since the code does not
resolve all commercial problems. For example, the questions
of the maximum interest rates allowed in each state and of
the existence of special consumer legislation would still have
to be carefully investigated. Yet, large national concerns, of
course, have been able to survive despite these burdens.
Schnader's trump card is that if the needs of large businesses are not met by the various states, then those businesses
\V·ill demand and obtain a federal commercial code. He
assumes that this result will be abhorrent to some who might
otherwise favor some local variation. Nonetheless, one may
question whether any advantage would be obtained by instead
having each state "voluntarily" adopt the same code. Even
if Schnader's assumptions regarding the wishes of business
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at 248.
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firms 7 and their power to obtain federal legislation are accu~
rate, one may still argue that it is closer to the rhetoric of
American democracy for Congress to enact a federal commercial code than for the nonelective Permanent Editorial Board
to determine, in fact, the commercial law in the 50 states.
One would, of course, be foolhardy to advocate ad hoc
unstudied tinkering with the official text; certainly the caliber
and energy of the contributors to the text should caution those
who are attempting to improve it. s Moreover, because of the
complexity and interlocking nature of the code, that which
at first blush appears only to be a minor change may in fact
have profound effects. Merit may also be found in a suggestion of the board, apparently followed at least by New York
State, that any proposed variation from the code first be
submitted to the board. If this procedure does not unduly
lengthen the time necessary for amendment, it seems an ideal
manner in which to take advantage of the expertise of that
board.
When California first enacted the California Commercial
Code, its version of the Uniform Commercial Code, it created
120 variations from the official text-more than any other
jurisdiction;9 apparently California lawmakers did not place
great importance on the goal of conformity with the official
text. However, the 1967 amendments to the California Commercial Code numerically lessen the variations from the official
text. Of the amendments that bring sections of the California
code into conformity with the official text, some effect no
substantive changes from the code as originally enacted in
California, and only remove variations, the purpose of which
had been greater clarity of text. lO However, several other
amendments, which had been recommended by the Advisory
7. Schnader's prediction may not even
be accurate. As later discussed in this
article, national business interests seem
quite willing to urge local varations
when a particular variation seems to be
to their immediate advantage.
8. Anyone who has ever found a section of the code to be less than precise,
50
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however, will enjoy reading Mellinkoff,
The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L. J. 185 (1967).
9. See Schnader, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. at
144.
10. Cal. Com. Code §§ 2403(4),
3112(b), 5116(2), 7403(3), 7507, 7508,
8304 and 8320(5).
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Committee to the (California) Senate on the Editorial Aspects
of the Uniform Commercial Code, and which purported only
to conform language, may, in fact, have substantively amended
the code. For example, a 1967 addition to section 2209
dealing with modification of contracts states, "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this division .
[sales]
must be satisfied if the contract as modified
is within its provisions." This provision, included in the
official text, had been omitted from the California code as
originally enacted. The Permanent Editorial Board/ I as well
as other commentators,I2 had pointed out that this omission
could only have resulted from a failure by the California
legislature to realize that the section deals with oral modifications of oral contracts. Although the amendment was
therefore desirable in order to prevent the use of oral modifications of oral contracts to avoid the requirements of the
statute of frauds, it is not certain that the same result would
necessarily have been reached under the former language. IS
Similarly, section 8313, a provision dealing with investment
securities held in street names, was amended to conform to
the official text. Although the Advisory Committee stated
that no substantive change was intended,I4 the Permanent Editorial Board had rejected the old California variation because
it would "deprive a purchaser of needed protection from his
broker. "15
It may seem that once amendments to the California code
are made, the question becomes moot whether the variation
was a substantive change from the official text, unless a case
has already arisen under the old language. However, with
legislative history that states that no substantive change was
intended, confusion may result from the argument that since
11. Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING STATES, no. 2, p. 35 (1965).
12. Coyne, Some Comments on Contracts and the California Commercial
Code, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1966).
13. Cal. Com. Code § 2209 still maintains some local variation. For a full
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discussion of problems raised by § 2209,
see Laube, CONTRACTS, in this volume.
14. SENATE JOURNAL, April 20, 1967,
p. 1237.
15. Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING
STATES, no. 2, p. 157 (1965).
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a certain result would have been obtained under the old
language, the legislative intent is that the same result now
be reached.
Several other amendments, supposedly intended only to
conform the California code, resulted even more clearly in
substantive change. When the code was first enacted in California, the statute of limitations section of Division 2, entitled
"Sales," was omitted, leaving in effect the old California law. I6
However, in this past year section 2725 was added. It is
interesting to note that one reason for the addition of section
2725 was to meet the Permanent Editorial Board's "lack of
uniformity" objection. However, even proponents of uniformity feel that uniformity of procedural provisions is not
at the top of the scale in importance. I7
Section 2725, unlike the old law that had provided for a
two-year limitation for oral sales contracts, now provides a
four-year statute of limitations for all sales contracts, whether
oral or written. The new law also makes explicit that although
the period of limitation may be lessened by contract to one
year, it cannot be extended by contract beyond the statutory
period. Moreover, the code makes clear that with some
exceptions,t8 the cause of action accrues at the time of breach,
regardless of the "aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach."
An amendment to section 3506 produced another substantive change. In every other state, payment of an instrument
16. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 337 and
339.
17. See Schnader, 3 AM. Bus. L. J.
at 139.
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18. Cal. Com. Code § 2725. Breach
of contract for sale; Limitation of Actions: Accrual of action: Time for
bringing second action: Retrospective
operation of section provides in part:
(2) A cause of action accrues when
the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except
that where a warranty explicitly extends
52
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to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of
action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subdivision (1)
i~ so terminated as to leave available a
remedy by another action for the same
breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time
limited and within six months after the
termination of the first action unless the
termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
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must be made in a reasonable time from presentment, but in
order to avoid dishonor, payment must be made "before the
close of business on the day of presentment." In California,
presumably because of the wide extent of branch banking,
an additional day was originally allowed. Upon observing
that no problems had arisen in the other states, the California
legislature decided to conform the section to the official text.
Only the passage of time will show whether local needs will
be met by this provision.
Another amendment substantially conforms section 7503,
dealing with the entrusting of goods and documents of title,
to the official text. 19 When the code was originally adopted,
California omitted the provision allowing rights in goods to
be lost to the good-faith purchaser of a document of title if
the owner of the goods "acquiesced in the procurement by
the bailor or his nominee of any document of title." The
provision was originally omitted from the California code
because of fear engendered by the official comments that
mere knowledge of the likelihood of shipping or storage might
be enough to cut off the title of the original owner. 20 The
Permanent Editorial Board having stated that this was "an
expansive reading,"! the Advisory Committee thereupon recommended that the provision be added. However, it is interesting to note that the committee has indicated that the goal
of uniformity has become more important than the original
substantive problem with which the legislature had been concerned. Legislative history is now added weight against the
feared "expansive reading." But certainly there is more likelihood now, than under the old California language, of such
an interpretation actually being made.
Section 8105, which affirms that securities governed by
Division 8 are negotiable instruments, was also amended in
order to eliminate a California variation. The effect of this
amendment will be greater in states other than California,
19. The California Code, unlike the
official text, does not mention delivery
orders.
20. See California Comments to
Commercial Code § 7503.

1. See Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING
STATES, no. 2, pp. 138-139 (1965).
CAL LAW 1967
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since many states have so-called "legal investment" statutes,
which require that securities that may be invested in by certain
agents must be negotiable instruments. When California
originally adopted the code, it was thought that since California had no such requirement, this section should be eliminated so that there would be no possible confusion that
sections of Division 3 of the code were thereby made applicable. However, in 1967, the amendment was adopted to
avert any possible problems regarding California securities
that might arise in other states having such statutes.
An amendment to section 8106 lessens the difference between the California and official text provisions governing
conflicts of laws for investment securities. The official text
simply states:
The validity of a security and the rights and duties of
the issuer with respect to registration of transfer are
governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules)
of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer.
California's version, on the other hand, originally had extensive provisions to allow California law to apply in many situations, even if the organization of the issuer were in a different
jurisdiction. After the 1967 amendment, however, California's provision more closely resembled the official text,
stating:
The validity of a security and the duty of an issuer to
register a transfer (Section 8401) are governed by the
law of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer or,
in the case of any national bank or other corporation
organized under the laws of the United States, by the
law of the jurisdiction in which such bank or other corporation has its principal place of business.
Even after this amendment, however, a problem raised by the
Permanent Editorial Board is still not solved since
the liability of an issuer for refusal to register a transfer
might be governed by the law of the state of organiza54
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tion while its liability for an improper registration would
be governed by the law of California. 2
Similarly, subsection 9301 (3) was amended to provide that
trustees in bankruptcy, assignees for the benefit of creditors,
and receivers in equity shall be considered lien creditors.
California originally did not enact this provision of the official
text.
However, the 1967 amendments do not all implement the
goal of achieving accord with the official text. Section 9104,
for example, was amended to an even further inconsistency
with the official version in order to make clear the fact that
Division 9 is not meant to apply to securities issued by public
bodies. Although the California comment states that no
substantive change is intended, the status of these securities
in other states is not as clear as it is in California. Thus, the
same act that, in some sections, eliminates variations based on
earlier attempts to clarify, in other sections continues this
same attempt at clarification. It is also interesting to note
that the amendment to section 9104 was actually suggested
by attorneys representing underwriters of these securities, a
group that, according to Schnader's analysis, would oppose
any local variations.
The amendment of section 9302 eliminates one local variation, but imposes another. The section provides exceptions
to the rule stating when a financing statement must be filed
in order to perfect a security interest. The 1967 amendment
eliminated the California variations, which had excepted assignments of claims against the United States, that had been
made under federal assignment of claims statutes. 3 However,
the amendment now excepts "assignments for the benefit of
all the creditors of the transferor, and subsequent transfers
by the assignee thereunder," an exception not made in the
official version.
The principal group of amendments causing a variance
between the California code and the official text reflects the
2. Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT ON
VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING
STATES, no. 2, pp. 144-145 (1965).

3. 31 U.S.C. § 203; 41 U.S.C. § 15.

CAL LAW 1967
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attempt to harmonize the California Commercial Code with
the new California Evidence Code. 4
Throughout the official text of the Uniform Commercial
Code, presumptions are raised. Section 1-201 (31) states:
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of
fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless
and until evidence is introduced which would support
a finding of its nonexistence.
For example, section 3-114(3) states, "Where the instrument
or any signature thereon is dated, the date is presumed to be
correct." Thus, if a payee of a note places that note in evidence, and no contrary evidence is presented, the date that
the maker signed on the note must be accepted as the date
when the note was made. However, neither the code nor
the comments state what effect the presumption raised will
have if the maker brings forth some evidence that the date
written was not the actual date of the note, or who will have
the ultimate burden of proof of the issue. Because of this
ambiguity, and the knowledge that a new evidence code
was being studied, the legislature originally refused to adopt
section 1-201 (31) ,5 leaving undefined, until the 1967 amendment, the word "presumption," used so often throughout the
code.
The California Evidence Code very neatly deals with presumptions. 6 Section 601 simply states: "Every rebuttable
presumption is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting the
burden of proof." The code then goes on to draw guidelines
by which judges may determine how to treat any given presumption. Section 603 states that presumptions affecting the
burden of producing evidence are those that have been enacted
solely "to facilitate the determination of the particular action
in which the presumption is applied," while section 605 defines
4. See generally, Note, The Law of
Evidence in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 GA. L. REV. 44 (1966).
5. See California Comments to Commercial Code § 1201(31).

56
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6. The California Commercial Code
uses only the concept of the rebuttable
presumption, and does not use the concept of the conclusive presumption.
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a burden of proof presumption as one "established to implement" some other public policy.
However, the California Law Revision Commission was
unwilling to allow the various presumptions raised by the
Commercial Code to be classified judicially according to these
broad standards. 7 Instead, upon their recommendation, the
legislature categorized the specific presumptions of the Commercial Code so that there would be predictability without
the necessity of first having a judicial determination. 8
The central provision dealing with this problem in the
Commercial Code is section 1210, 9 which states, "Except
as otherwise provided in Section 1202, the presumptions established by this code are presumptions affecting the burden of
producing evidence." Section 604 of the Evidence Code,
then, makes clear that the trier of fact must assume "the
existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence.
" The Evidence Code goes on, however, to clarify
what section 1-201 (31) leaves unclear: if evidence is introduced that would support a finding of the nonexistence of the
presumed fact, "the trier of fact shall determine the existence
or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
without regard to the presumption," although he may draw
appropriate inferences.
Section 1202 represents the one provision in the code where
the legislature this year created a burden of proof presumption.lo Subsection (2) creates a presumption affecting the
7. California Law Revision Commission Recommendation: Related to the
Evidence Code, No.3-Commercial
Code Revisions, October 1966, p. 309.
8. The report at one point (p. 307)
states that one reason why a legislative
determination is desirable is because
"the general standards provided in the
Evidence Code do not permit ready classification of all the presumptions in the
Commercial Code." The report then
goes on to state (p. 308) that in most
cases it is relatively easy to determine
the intent of the drafters of the Uniform

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

Code, though admittedly in a few cases
it would be difficult to determine how
the drafters would have classified the
presumptions based on the California
Evidence Code. Note the optimism of
the comment in saying that the amendment is not a substantive change from
the official text.
9. This section was recommended by
the California Law Revision Commission as § 1209.
10. Certain other provisions in the
code affect burden of proof without the
CAL LAW 1967
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burden of producing evidence, that such documents as bills
of lading are presumed to be authenticl l and genuine. However, if a document is found to be authentic and genuine,
either through this presumption or otherwise, a presumption
affecting the burden of proof is then raised that the facts
stated in that document are true. Because of section 606 of
the Evidence Code, a party claiming that the facts are incorrect must therefore bear the burden of proof on that
issue; that is, he must by a preponderance of the evidence
convince the trier of fact that the stated information is untrue.
There was one other amendment dealing with burdens.
California originally enacted the official text of section 2719,
dealing with contractual modification or limitation of remedy.
Section 2719 (3) stated:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not.

The 1967 amendment, by stating that "[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is invalid unless it is proved that the limitation is not unconscionable," eliminates the use of the prima
facie concept while retaining the distinction between commercial and noncommercial loss. Limitation of consequential
damages where the loss is commercial is, however, still valid
unless it is proved that the limitation is unconscionable. 12
concept of presumptions.

See § 3307

(l)(a).

11. Section 1202 was also amended
to make clear that the presumption only
applies in actions concerning the contract that authorized the document.
12. Although this provision was
enacted as recommended by the commission in order "to clarify the allocation of the burden of proof," it is interesting that the legislature did not see
58
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fit to accept another recommendation of
the commission, that § 4103, relating to
a bank's responsibility for failure to exercise ordinary care, also be amended
to remove the prima facie concept. Although the commission itself was unsure
whether, under § 602 of the Evidence
Code, a presumption was created, the
comment to § 1210 merely stated that
no rebuttable presumption was created.
It is difficult to see why tb,~ Ian~a¥«
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The Uniform Commercial Code and the Law of Contracts
The spheres of the Commercial Code and the traditional
law of contracts obviously overlap. Section 1102(3) spe~
cifically states:
The effect of provisions of this code may be varied by
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this code
and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this code may not
be disclaimed by agreement. [Emphasis added.]
However, in order to determine whether any specific contrac~
tual agreement will be given effect, a court has to interpret
the phrase "except as otherwise provided." An examination
of one of the 1967 amendments will be a helpful illustration.
The code makes use of the concept of fungible goods and
states in section 1201 (17), " 'Fungible' with respect to goods
or securities means goods or securities of which any unit is,
by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like
unit." It would seem then, merely because of the definition,
that one could not simply contract to call nonfungible goods
fungible, even though there is no specific language in the
code against doing so. But the 1967 amendment, conforming
the California text to the official text, now provides:
Goods which are not fungible shall be deemed fungible
for the purposes of this code to the extent that under
a particular agreement or document unlike units are
treated as equivalents.
Thus it is now clear that parties may contract to deem goods
fungible whenever this suits their purpose.
Similarly, an amendment to subsection 3107 (2) makes it
clear that a negotiable instrument may require payment in a
foreign currency. Thus, parties once again are given more
leeway in their financial arrangements.
However, the amendment to section 3112(c), due at least
in part to legislative confusion about this section, restricts
of § 4103 should be treated differently
from the language of § 2719, and it is
difficult to know the effect of the lan-

guage, assuming it is not to be treated
as a rebuttable presumption.
CAL LAW 1967
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the right of parties to include certain clauses in an instrument
and still have that instrument considered negotiable. Section
3104(1) states:
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this
division must . . . [c]ontain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other
except as authorized by this division.
promise
. . . [Emphasis added.]
Section 3112 is the primary section that states those other
promises that may be made.
Subsection 3112(c) of the official text states that "a promise or power to maintain or protect collateral or to give additional collateral" does not destroy negotiability. As originally
enacted, the same subsection in the California code had
allowed, in addition, and without affecting negotiability, a
promise or power
to furnish financial information or to do or refrain from
doing any other act for the protection of the obligation
expressed in the instrument not involving the payment
of money on account of the indebtedness evidenced by
the instrument.
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this variation
fearing that on the one hand, it would open the door to "an
indefinite number of possibly long and complex provisions
. . .,"13 and on the other hand, the provision was so vague as
to offer little guidance as to which provisions would be valid
and which not.
Somehow, in the 1967 amendment the phrase "to give additional collateral," rather than the objectionable portion, was
eliminated. The California Code comment to section 3112
states that this was due to "an error resulting from the process
of amendment."14 Therefore, because of the error, it is impos··
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13. Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING
STATES, no. 2, p. 56 (1965).
14. Although the California Comment states that the Advisory Commit60
CAL LAW 1967

tee had recommended that the section
be amended to conform to the official
text, such recommendation does not appear in the official report of that committee.
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sible to state whether an instrument giving the payee the
right to demand additional collateral is negotiable. It can
be argued that since the code provision permitting such a
clause was specifically excluded from the section, the right
to put in the clause has been eliminated. It can also be argued,
however, that the right to do so is still plainly included in
the objectionable clause. It would seem that until the legislature corrects its error, the latter is the more desirable result,
considering that this useful commercial procedure15 is allowed
in all other states.
Another section adopted in 1967 was section 1209, dealing
with subordinate agreements. After studying this provision,
which began as a New York variation, the Permanent Editorial Board recommended it for optional amendment. 16 By
the language of the section itself, it is deemed to be merely
declaratory of the existing law. It allows the highly useful
commercial technique of allowing one party to subordinate
his rights, in case of insolvency, to another, and states that
the mere fact of such an agreement does not per se create a
security agreement. Thus the parties are free to create this
"halfway house," rather than be forced to choose between
having no priority or creating a security interest.
Finally, section 6103 was amended to a greater degree
of inconsistency with the official text, although the amendment may also be considered as giving more freedom to contract. It excludes from Division 6, dealing with bulk sales,
all assignments for the benefit of creditors. Thus, partial
assignments may be exempted from the requirements that the
official text places on them. The official text only excludes
"general assignments for the benefit of all the creditors.
"
Case Law-Negotiation of Checks17
Three cases dealing with negotiation of checks were decided
during the reported period. Of greater significance than the
15. Of course, different issues are presented when a note is given in return
for consumer goods.
16. See Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code,
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REPORT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN
ADOPTING STATES, no. 3, p. 11 (1966).
17. Other cases that involve some
aspects of the Uniform Commercial
Code are treated in this volume in
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substantive holdings, however, was the manner in which the
court treated the newly enacted code. To a great extent, the
code was treated as a reenactment and rephrasing of pre-code
law. In view of a natural desire by judges (and lawyers) to
work with the familiar, this approach is understandable.
When deciding one case in which the code governed, the
court of appeal meticulously attempted to show that the
code did not even deal with the problem presented. IS Paradoxically, during this period of transition, a court of appeal
of the same district, deciding a difficult case under pre-code
law, relied on the code as persuasive authority, since it felt
the result was clearer under the code. In so deciding, the
court presupposed that no change from pre-code law could
have been intended in the code. 19
In Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens National
Bank,20 the court of appeal, was reluctant to use the code as
a means to decide afresh an old question of law. The question
presented and answered affirmatively by the court was:
Does a joint payee of a check have a cause of action
against a collecting bank which has paid a check made
payable to joint payees bearing an indorsement effected
by one joint payee signing his own name and forging
that of his joint payee?l
There were four checks involved, and since two were drawn
before the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and two afterwards, the court had to apply both old and new
law. It seems more important for purposes of discussion,
however, to concentrate on the court's solution under the
code.
The issue presented to the court had two facets. First,
the court had to decide whether the joint payee had any cause
of action. If it found that he did, then the court would have
Laube, CONTRACTS, and McIntosh, REAL
PROPERTY.
18. Harry H. White Lumber Co. v.
Crocker-Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 253 Cal.
App.2d 423, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967).
19. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Security
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First Nat'l. Bank, 248 Cal. App.2d 75,
56 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1967).
20. 253 Cal. App.2d 423, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1967).
1. 253 Cal. App.2d at 425, 61 Cal,
Rptr. at 382.
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to inquire whether that action could be maintained against
the collecting bank.
The court's reasoning is clear on the first question. Section
3116 states: "An instrument payable to the order of two
or more persons . . . [i]f not in the alternative is payable
to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced
only by all of them." The forgery by one joint payee does
not alter the rights of the other, since section 3404(1) states,
"Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of
the person whose name is signed.
" Since section
1201 (43) states that" '[u]nauthorized' signature or indorsement means one made without actual, implied or apparent
authority and includes a forgery," the only possible conclusion
is that the joint payee did have a cause of action under the
code.
The court thereupon had to face the more difficult question
of whether the joint payee could bring that action against the
collecting bank. The court quoted from the code, as follows:
Section 3306: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in
due course any person takes the instrument subject to
( d) The defense that he
holds the
instrument.
by theft.
" Section 3419:
"(1) An instrument is converted when
(c) It
is paid on a forged indorsement."2
The court then citing, but not quoting, the comments to sections 3404 and 3 419, concluded that although section 3419
gives the payee of a forged check a cause of action against
the drawee bank, "no change is indicated as to preexisting
California case law permitting the payee to recover from a
collecting bank which has paid out on a forged endorsement."3
Although the comments do not indicate any change, neither
2. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 428, 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 385.
3. 253 Cal. App.2d at 430, 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 386. Curiously, the court relied
on Stone & Webster v. First Nat'!. Bank
& Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d
358, 99 A.L.R.:2d 628 (1962). Stone
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was an action by a drawer against the
collecting bank. In it, the court also
felt that the code effected no change,
but old law in Massachusetts had not
allowed the action.
Moreover, the
court in Stone carefully considered the
policy questions involved.
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do they address themselves to this issue. The court's result
can only be reached by assuming that "paid" refers only to
an action by a drawee bank, a conclusion certainly not made
clear in the code. But the court concluded that the code
did give the payee a cause of action against the collecting
bank.
It is unfortunate that the court in White did not use the
opportunity, in facing this issue for the first time under the
code, to discuss whether granting an action against a collecting bank is desirable. Certainly section 3419 ( c) can be read
broadly enough to reach a conclusion contrary to that reached
by the court. The court then could have balanced the competing interests involved. In favor of allowing the action
against the collecting bank would be the argument that the
joint payee would thus be permitted to avoid a multiplicity
of actions, since a forger who steals a series of checks drawn
on a number of banks is likely to cash them at the same bank.
Moreover, circuity of action would be avoided, since the payee
would otherwise have to sue the drawee, who would in turn
sue the collecting bank for breach of warranty under section
4207. On the other hand, it can be argued that the thrust
of Divisions 3 and 4 is against allowing the actions, since
these divisions generally lessen the responsibility of collecting
banks. Even more important than the disposition of this
particular problem, however, is that courts should use the
occasion of deciding a case for the first time under the code
as an opportunity to re-reason old problems.
In Pacific Indemnity Company v. Security First National
Bank,4 a case where old law was clearly applicable, the majority reached a result that seemed even more clearly warranted
under the code. The court then reasoned that since no
change was intended, the code's solution could be used as
persuasive authority.
The facts of the case are complicated and, as the court
of appeal pointed out, the record does not adequately disclose
them. Certain facts, however, are clear. Brown was an
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4. 248 Cal. App.2d 75, 56 Cal. Rptr.
142 (1967).
64
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employee of Credit Managers, a firm "engaged in the business
of administering the affairs and assets of various businesses
which had made assignments to it for the benefit of creditors."5
Brown, making use of the firm's checkwriting machine, caused
numerous checks payable to the defendant bank to be drawn.
Even though notations on the front of these checks indicated
that they were being given for payment in full of various
debts supposedly owed to the defendant bank, the defendant
allowed Brown to place these checks, which were drawn on
another bank, into his personal checking account. Under the
terms of a fidelity bond, Credit Managers' indemnity company
reimbursed Credit Managers for losses they could not recover
from Brown, and then sued the defendant for the loss. At
the trial, evidence was presented that showed that the bank
had not followed its usual precautions with these checks.
Evidence was also presented from which it could be inferred
that Credit Managers was remiss in its auditing procedures.
The superior court found for the defendant, but the court
of appeal reversed.
In a rather lengthy opinion, Justice Herndon attempted to
dispel what he felt was an error that the trial court had made,
and that the dissent was trying to perpetuate. The trial court
had applied the so-called fictitious payee rule. That rule is
embodied in former Civil Code section 30906 and currently
appears in § 3405 7 of the Commercial Code. It protects the
drawee bank from suffering loss when an employee pads the
payroll of his employer, who has an account at that bank.
As Justice Herndon pointed out, and the concurrence made
clear, this case presents a different circumstance. Here the
bank was the payee of the check. The fraud of the employee
5. 248 Cal. App.2d at 79, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 145.

6. Stats. 1917 c. 751, p. 1534, § 1, as
amended Stats. 1945 c. 658, p. 1315 § 1.
7. Cal. Comm. Code § 3405 provides:
(1) An indorsement by any person in
the name of a named payee is effective
if:
(a) An imposter by use of the mails
or otherwise has induced the maker or
5
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drawer to issue the instrument to him
or his confederate in the name of the
payee; or
(b) A person signing as or on behalf
of a maker or drawer intends the payee
to have no interest in the instrument;
or
(c) An agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the
name of the payee intending the latter
to have no such interest.
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was completed because of the bank's carelessness in letting
funds it received leave its hands. Therefore, Justice Herndon
concluded that as against the employer, the bank should suffer
the burden of being bound by the notations on the face of
the checks.
The court then had to consider whether the paid surety
had the same equities, vis-a.-vis the bank, as the employer
would have had. It implied that since the bank was not totally
innocent,S it could not therefore maintain that the indemnitor
should bear the burden. However, the court did not clearly
state whether a bank would be liable any time it was negligent,
or only liable when its negligence was greater than that of
the insured party.
Once again, the court's approach was more significant than
its holding. The court quoted:
"Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is a revision
and reorganization of the existing Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law now found in our Civil Code. While
new language has been used, the changes from the existing NIL are not too great and to all intents and purposes
it may be said that the law in this area remains the
same." (Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature by
Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary (19591961) Part I, the Uniform Commercial Code, pp. 342343.)9
Even the dissent felt compelled to offer his tentative belief
that the code did not change prior law!lO
Nonetheless, it might be helpful to look at the one other
indorsement case that reached the court of appeal this year,
and to see how counsel might have argued for an opposite
result if the code, rather than pre-code law, had been applicable.
8. The court thus distinguished Meyers v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 92,
77 P.2d 1084 (1938).
66
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9. 248 Cal. App.2d at 92, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 153.
10. 248 Cal. App.2d at 105, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 161.
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In Cameron v. Security First National Bank,Il the plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Cameron, received a check as joint payees. At
that time, the plaintiffs had a joint savings account with the
bank. The husband was also authorized to sign at the same
bank for the checking account of Amber Construction Company, of which he was a primary stockholder and officer.
Shortly before the Camerons received the check, an officer
of the bank had notified Mr. Cameron's secretary that the
account of Amber Construction Company was overdrawn.
The secretary replied that Mr. Cameron was expecting a
check and would cover the deficit when it arrived. When
the check in question did arrive, the Camerons indorsed it
and wrote "For Deposit Only" under their signatures. Afterwards, the secretary placed the number of the Amber account
under the signature.
When the secretary arrived at the bank to deposit the check,
a bank officer, noting that the check was jointly payable to
the Camerons rather than to Amber, stated, "This appears
like Mr. Cameron may have wanted this to go into his own
account."12 Although the secretary said that such was not
the case, the officer attempted to call Mr. Cameron. Since
Cameron could not be reached, the officer accepted the check
for the Amber account.
Seven months later, after his association with Amber had
ended, Cameron and his wife sued the bank for failure to
honor the restrictive indorsement. The court of appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court, which had found that
the bank had no notice of any defect, that the secretary had
ostensible authority to deposit the check in the Amber account, that the bank was an innocent party, and that since
plaintiffs had been negligent, they must bear the responsibility
of the secretary's act.
There is no reason to suspect that applicable principles
concerning the agency of the secretary should be considered
changed by the code. Section 1103 specifically states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the
11. 251 Cal. App.2d 450, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 563 (1967).
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principles of
principal and agent
shaH
supplement its provisions."
Section 3206(3) on the effect of restrictive indorsements
then provides:
Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under
an indorsement which is conditional or includes the
words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank,"
or like terms (paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 3205)
must payor apply any value given by him for or on
the security of the instrument consistently with the indorsement, and to the extent that he does so he becomes
a holder for value. In addition such transferee is a
holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the
requirements of Section 3302 on what constitutes a
holder in due course.
With the secretary considered the agent of the Camerons
for purposes of signing the account number, the problem still
remains, however, of whether the bank took with notice of
defect in the instrument and thus should be responsible for
the loss. In deciding the case, the court had interpreted
section 3137 13 of the old Civil Code to narrowly restrict what
would be considered notice. In keeping with the usual interpretation of that section, the court quoted from Christian v.
California Bank.·a
Under this section [Civ.Code, § 3137] it is the wellsettled rule that "mere knowledge of facts sufficient to
put a prudent man on inquiry, without actual knowledge,
or mere suspicion of an infirmity or defect of title, does
not preclude the transferee from occupying the position
of a holder in due course, unless the circumstances or
suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith.
[T]his rule is
13. Stats. 1917, c. 751, p. 1541 § 1.
To constitute notice of an infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating the same, the
person to whom it is negotiated must
have had actual knowledge of the in68
CAL LAW 1967
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firmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.
14. 30 Ca1.2d 421, 182 P.2d 554
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subject to the qualification that 'where the circumstances
are such as to justify the conclusion that the failure to
make inquiry arose from a suspicion that inquiry would
disclose a vice or defect in the instrument or transaction,
such indorsee is charged with knowledge.' "15
However, Commercial Code section 1201 (25) leaves open
the possibility of more liberal findings of notice. That section
provides:
A person has "notice" of a fact when (a) He has actual
knowledge of it; or (b) He has received a notice or
notification of it; or (c) From all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has
reason to know that it exists.
From the language of this section it would appear that Cameron could argue that from all the facts and circumstances
known to it, and as evidenced by its attempt to contact
Cameron by telephone, the bank had reason to know of the
defect.
This interpretation of section 1201 (25) might lead to a
desirable result. However, it is doubtful that the courts
would accept it in view of their reluctance to use the code
to change old results. Moreover, a counterargument could
be made that the code was not meant to revive this objective
test, but to retain the so-called subjective test of notice in
fact. 16
Consumer Credit

Commercial law today is increasingly regulated by statutes
that deal with the problems of consumer credit; intensive
attention is being paid to the practice of consumer purchase
of goods through instalment contracts. 17 California's basic
statutory scheme deals with the purchase of motor vehicles
15. 251 Cal. App.2d at 458, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 568.
16. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure
of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L.
R€.v. 48 at 56-60 (1966).
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under the Rees-Levering Actl8 and with the purchase of all
other consumer goods under the Unruh Act. l9 The year 1967
brought amendments to both of these acts.
Rees-Levering Act20

Several attempts were made by the legislature to fill loopholes that sellers had discovered in the statute and had capitalized upon. The first such amendment governs section
2983 of the Civil Code, which deals with the amount recoverable by the buyer when a conditional sales contract is held
to be unenforceable because it violates either subsection 2982
(a), dealing with formal requirements, or section 2982(c),
dealing with finance charges.
The original 1945 Automobile Sales Act had simply stated
that the amount recoverable would be "three times the total
amount paid on the contract balance."l However, that phrase
caused confusion when the purchaser had traded in one automobile as part of the purchase price of another. In City
Lincoln-Mercury Company v. Lindsey,2 the supreme court
held that to determine "the total amount paid," the automobile traded in should be valued at its actual value rather
than at the presumably fictitious trade-in value. Thus, after
that decision, a seller could overvalue trade-ins, in order to
increase market appeal, without fear of loss if the contract

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/4

18. Automobile Sales Finance Act,
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2981-2984.3.
19. Retail Installment Sales Act, Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 1801-1812.10.
In addition, of course, the Civil Code
also deals specifically with certain other
business practices. For example, one
1967 act (see Cal. Civ. Code § 1716)
forbids sending to a potential customer
"any writing that could reasonably be
interpreted as a statement or invoice,
for goods not yet ordered or for services
not yet performed and not yet ordered,
unless there appears on the face of the
statement or invoice or writing in 30point boldface type the following warning:
This is a solicitation for the order of
70
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goods or services and you are under no
obligation to make payment unless you
accept the offer contained herein."
20. For articles discussing the ReesLevering Act, see Recent Legislation
-The Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle
Sales & Finance Act, 10 UCLA L. REv.
125 (1962); Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, 36 CAL. S. BAR J.
688 (1961).
1. Stats. 1945 c. 1030, p. 1993, § 9
(c).

2. 52 Ca1.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851, 73
A.L.R.2d 1420 (1959); see also
G.M.A.C. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 351 P.2d 768 (1960).
3. Stats. 1961 c. 1626, p. 3538, § 4.
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proved unenforceable. In 1961, however, the legislature
changed this result by providing:
The amount recoverable for property traded in as all
or part of the down payment shall be equal to the agreed
cash value of such property as the value appears in the
conditional sale contract. 3
The consumer was then relieved from having to prove actual
value; rather, he could rely on the stated value.
However, some sellers were quick to adjust to the new
statute and to realize that by inducing the buyer to accept
an artificially low trade-in value and giving a corresponding
reduction in the sales price, they could place themselves in an
advantageous position if the contract proved to be unenforceable. The 1967 amendment to section 2983 now gives the
buyer adequate protection, stating:
The amount recoverable for property traded in as all or
part of the down payment shall be equal to the agreed
cash value of such property as the value appears on the
conditional sale contract or the fair market value of such
property as of the time the contract is made, whichever is
greater.
In addition to protecting the purchaser if the contract proves
unenforceable, this provision will also encourage the seller
to value the trade-ins as closely as possible to the actual value.
The amendment will thus have some aspects of a truth-inlending bill, in that the buyer will be able to get a better idea
of the true economic cost of the new car since the seller
will be encouraged to give an accurate estimate of the value
of the automobile that the buyer is trading in.
Civil Code section 2984.2 was also amended as an attempt
to fill another feared loophole. However, the success of this
change was only partial. The 1961 amendment to the act
had prevented a seller from taking either title to, or a lien on,
real or personal property other than the subject matter of
the sale, in connection with the conditional sale of an automobile. However, some sellers attempted to evade the plain
import of the act by urging the buyer to negotiate a loan
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
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from a loan company that had an "understanding" with the
seIler, giving land or other property for coIlateral on that
loan, and then, with the money borrowed, complete "an outright sale" of the automobile. 4
Senate BiII 778 was passed to remedy this situation. As
first proposed, the bill would have made unenforceable, to
the same extent as an agreement for conditional sale, any
agreement in connection with a sale of an automobile. Probably because of fear that a lender who was not aware of the
use of a loan might find himself with an unenforceable contract, the bill as finaIly enacted merely makes unenforceable
such agreements between the buyer and the seller.
However, assuming that one of the primary evils that ReesLevering is trying to prevent is that of a buyer losing valuable
assets through defaulting on payment for a car, one wonders
how effective this amendment will be. Although a buyer
may be able to have his contract with the seIler rescinded,
he will have given the security interest to another party.
Although the amendment may deter seIlers from trying to
arrange such transactions, even if one feels that good-faith
lenders' agreements should be held enforceable, might it not
be preferable to aIlow buyer rescission of the contract with
the lender, at least when lender knowledge is shown?5
Another change, though of a more limited nature, was
effected by amending section 2983.2 of the Civil Code, which
deals with the notice that must be given on the sale of a
repossessed automobile. The time of notice was doubled,
so that at least 10 days' notice must now be given to anyone
liable on the conditional sales contract. This is extended to
20 days if the notice is given to someone outside of the state.
AdditionaIly, section 2983.2 now states that notice may be
"personaIly served or shaIl be sent by certified mail, return
receipt requested."
4. Of course, even under the act as
it existed before the 1967 amendments,
one could not rule out the possibility
that a court would look to the substance
of the transaction if it felt that the loan
was, in fact, from the seHer.
72
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In addition to these legislative changes, several cases helped
to clarify the Rees-Levering Act. In San Jose Autocar White
Co. v. Williamson,6 the purchaser of two trailer trucks sought
protection of the Rees-Levering provisions, even though the
trucks had been bought for a commercial purpose. Despite
defendant's argument that the act was designed to protect
"an unsophisticated individual buyer purchasing from a
sophisticated seller",7 the court refused to depart from the
plain meaning of the statute, which limits application to
any vehicle required to be registered under the Vehicle
Code which is bought for use primarily for personal or
family purposes, and does not mean any vehicle which
is bought for use primarily for business or commercial
purposes. s
The court went on to buttress its argument, finding that
although the original Automobile Sales Act of 1945 did not
exclude commercial sales, one purpose of the 1961 amendments was to limit the purview of the act by the purpose of
the purchaser rather than by the magnitude of the sale. Conceding the appealing nature of defendant's argument, if
addressed to the legislature, it is difficult to see how the court
could have accepted it in the face of the statutory language.
In Highway Trailer v. Frankel,9 the court of appeal affirmed a trial court's determination that a contract was unenforceable as to the unpaid balance because, on the contract,
the sum listed for cash downpayment included a postdated
check. lO The court held that this violated section 2982(2)
of the Civil Code, which requires that the contract set forth
[t]he amount of the buyer's down payment, and whether
made in cash or represented by the net agreed value
of described property traded in, or both, together with
6. 249 Cal. App.2d 619, 57 Cal. Rptr.
692 (1967).
7. 249 Cal. App.2d at 621, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 694.
8. Cal. Civ. Code § 2981(j).
9. 250 Cal. App.2d 733, 58 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1967).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

10. Even though the court was dealing with law existing before the 1967
amendment, the issue confronting the
court would be similarly decided if the
facts arose today.

CAL LAW 1967

73

27

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 4

Commerciai Transactions

a statement of the respective amounts credited for cash
and for such property.
The court thus extended a decision previously reached
by an appellate court in the case of Bratta v. Caruso Car Co./ 1
where it was held that a contract was unenforceable because
the buyer had given a promissory note that was included in
the stated "cash" downpayment. In Highway Trailer, the
court perceived that when the cash downpayment sum includes
a postdated check, the danger of the buyer being misled as
to the balance due is equal to the danger created when a
promissory note is included in the stated cash downpayment,
since the buyer would also have to make good at some future
date.
Because the court held the contract unenforceable on the
above grounds, it did not have to consider the related issue
of whether a currently dated check should be considered
"cash" for purposes of section 2982. The court did state,
however, that it would assume, without deciding, "that a currently dated check, drawn on an account having sufficient
funds to pay it, is 'cash.' ,,12 Considering the supreme court's
refusal to hold contracts unenforceable that suffer only from
slight technical deficiencies/ 3 it would seem unlikely that any
court would invalidate the common practice of supplying a
currently dated check for payment. However, automobile
sellers might place themselves in a more secure position by
clearly indicating on the sales form that a check has been
received in the transaction.
Unruh Act14

Prior to its amendment in 1967, section 1804.2 of the Civil
Code stated that if a buyer did not give notice "of the facts
[aJ claim or defense of the buyer,,15
giving rise to.
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11. 166 Cal. App.2d 661, 333 P.2d
807 (1958).
12. 250 Cal. App.2d at 736, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 885.
13. See Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman,
58 Cal.2d 23, 22 Cal. Rptr. 657, 372
P.2d 649 (1962).
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L. J. 312 (1961).
15. Stats 1961, c. 1214, p. 2951 § 5.
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within 15 days of request by an assignee of the seller, his
rights must be cut off. Whether such a provision in fact
gives any protection to the average consumer has long been
questioned. As Professor Dunham has pointed out:
Many people have commented on the incongruity of
starting to solve a problem on the assumption that there
is a group so ignorant that they cannot operate in the
bargaining process, and then proceeding to protect these
same people by creating more rights for them in court,
or before administrative agencies, as to which they will
be presumed equally, if not more, ignorant. I6
One may similarly question whether the average consumer
would reply to such a request by an assignee. Moreover,
since most sellers will assign their contracts immediately, if
they plan to assign at all, the buyer may not even be aware
of defenses such as breach of warranty until after the IS-day
period had elapsed.
The 1967 amendment removes all burdens from the buyer
and provides:
An assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all claims
and defenses of the buyer against the seller arising out
of the sale notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary.17
However, the amendment makes clear that if the assignee
had no knowledge of the seller's noncompliance with the
statute, the buyer's claim can only be asserted as a matter of
defense, and then only to the extent of the debt owed to the
assignee. 18

Collection Procedures
The extension of consumer credit also raises problems concerning remedies thereby made available to the creditor or
16. Dunham, Research for Uniform
Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus.
LAW 997, at 1002-1003 (1965).
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2.
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18. See C.E.B., 1967 REVIEW OF
pp. 34-35, for the
possible meaning of a cross-reference to
Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.7.
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his assignee. Wage garnishment, an attempt to collect the
debt from the employer of the debtor, is one common remedy
employed by creditors. Although this method has been under
growing attack/ 9 the 1967 legislature was unable to effect
any meaningful change. Numerous bills, however, were introduced that would have exempted wages from attachment
and execution;20 one of these bills would have virtually prevented an employer from firing an employee because wages
were garnished. 1 At present, for all practical purposes, only
50 percent of wages are exempt in California; this is the
smallest exemption allowed in any of the 10 most populated
states. 2
Minor amendments not specifically dealing with wage garnishment, but dealing generally with execution and attachment, were made to the Code of Civil Procedure. The exemption of an automobile was raised from a straight $350, to
$350 "over and above all encumbrances" if the total value
of the automobile is below $1,000. Similarly, a debtor may
now exempt a housetrailer of the value of $2,500 above all
encumbrances, if neither the debtor nor his spouse has another
homestead. 3
Another amendment aids creditors by clearly allowing
partial attachment. 4 Thus, a creditor can now attach an
asset that is worth less than the entire amount claimed and
pay a bonding fee only for the amount attached, rather than
for the entire amount of the claim.
19. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in
California: A Study and Recommendalions, 53 CAL. L. REV. 1214 (1965).
20. See
(1967).
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e.g.,

Assembly

Bill

435

1. Assembly Bill 613 (1967).
2. See 53 CAL. L. REV. 1214, at 12151223.

3. Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 690.24.
4. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 538-540.
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